Personal AnecdoteThe first resulted in an 18 month schedule slip on a system schedule that was 18 months from go-ahead to completion of qualification testing. At the beginning of the program a buy decision was made and the power supply development was awarded to the lowest bidder. When it became apparent the design activity could not deliver, the contract was pulled and awarded to the next lowest bidder. When it became apparent that they also could not deliver, the power supply was pulled inside. However, instead of drawing on a group of designers who had strong experience in switching-mode power supply design, the company gave it to some excellent designers with strong backgrounds in communications and analog design (one of the engineers I talked with). When they ran into trouble, the corporation finally tapped their power supply design experts (the other engineer I talked with) and the job was completed. The rest of the system was completed on the original schedule up to the start of qualification testing and waited on the dock for qualification testing for 18 months before the power supplies were available. The final result was an 18 month schedule slip for underestimating the complexity of power supply design.
The second started the same, but ended up on schedule. Again a buy decision was made and the power supply development was awarded to the lowest bidder. Again, when it became apparent the design activity could not deliver, the contract was pulled. But this time work was pulled inside to give more management control over results. Also, the company informed their government customer of the problem and the government offered their expertise. That is how I got involved. The company found and gave the project to the best qualified power supply engineer in the corporation, told him the schedule was sacred and to do everything possible to keep the system on schedule using the full resources of the corporation. He and his management first selected the best corporate facility in the country to produce the power supply, which was on the west coast, and assembled a team to do the job, mostly from east coast engineers. They were placed in a hotel near the west coast plant and worked between 60 and 80 hours a week. Two of the engineers were control experts and had the best computer tools available in the corporation to work the stability issues. Another was an electromagnetic interference expert who made sure everything in this area was done right. Magnetic designers, layout and packaging experts, and manufacturing experts rounded out the team. Most of the system tests were completed using laboratory power supplies, but when qualification testing started, the final power supplies were there. The final result was a system delivered on time. What are the lessons learned? The problems started on both of these programs by awarding the power supply contract to the lowest bidder. This invites buy-in by unqualified design activities. The Navy recognized this problem in Navy Power Supply Reliability - Design and Manufacturing Guidelines and other directives which state: "A fundamental criterion in power supply source selection should be the bidder's stated, perceived, and demonstrated ability to comply with these guidelines." [Navy Power Supply Reliability - Design and Manufacturing Guidelines]
Lesson #1. The lowest bidder is not the primary consideration for contract selection. The primary consideration is that the bidder must be perceived as being able to do the job. The bidder usually establishes this by the experience of their designers and manufacturing personnel in the design and manufacture of similar power supplies. Also their track record in accurate bidding of the cost and schedule on similar power supplies. I once asked a successful power supply buyer what the three most important things he would recommend to other buyers. His list was: - Vendor Selection
- Vendor Selection
- Vendor Selection
Lesson #2. When in trouble ask yourself how you can do things better, rather than repeat past mistakes. In the first example, they just repeated their first mistake -- giving the contract to the lowest, and unqualified, bidder -- then when they brought it in-house, continued to give it to an unqualified bidder, an in-house design activity with no power supply experience. Lesson #3. Ask for help when you first get into trouble and then apply a big enough hammer to get the job done. Large corporations have many shortcomings, but one advantage they have are formidable resources they can apply to a problem. In the first example, when they finally pulled the contract in house, they gave it to the best they had locally -- who had little to no power supply experience (after all, power supply design should be no problem for experienced analog and communication designers) instead of tapping the corporate power supply experience. Eventually they tapped their in-house expertise and finally got an excellent power supply -- at an extremely high cost in terms of schedule slip and the associated cost overruns. In the second example, when program management perceived a schedule problem, they not only asked that the full resources of the corporation be applied, but also asked for any resources their customer, the government, could offer. By asking for help, and recognizing what was needed to get the job done, it got done. This failure to ask for help is getting worse instead of better in today's environment of product teams. Teams and their management pride themselves on their ability to get the job done. But often they get in over their head because a generalist team member thinks they can do the job of a specialist. When they finally realize they can't, the program schedule is usually at risk. Do not use this information for design without independent verification of the information. Editor: Jerrold Foutz |
